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INTRODUCTION
In December 1985 the Council of Ministers of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) enacted legislation in the form of a Directive (85/649/ 
EEC) banning the use of anabolic hormones in livestock production as of 
I January 1988. This Directive was misguided in its conception; by indis-
criminately prohibiting all products, it in fact effectively eliminates safe, 
legitimate products. It thereby encourages the use of unapproved, poten-
tially dangerous products, with the result that the health of consumers is 
placed in jeopardy—an ironic state of affairs to emerge from legislation 
ostensibly promulgated to allay “consumer anxieties”. The hormone ban is 
inherently unenforceable (thus in essence inviting black market violations 
while economically penalizing those who comply with the directive), and 
is generally disastrous in its implications for European agriculture, world 
trade and the future of the technology upon which agricultural productiv-
ity depends.
FALSE PERCEPTIONS
Prior to 1980 the European public was largely unaware of the use of hor-
mones in animal production. Public attention was drawn to the “estrogen 
scandal” in Italy in 1980, when DES residues were discovered in a batch of 
manufactured baby food and those residues were assumed to have origi-
nated from the use of DES as an anabolic agent in veal calves and to have 
been the cause of several cases of abnormal sexual development in school 
children. The Italian press fabricated a “link” between the use of hor-
mones in livestock production and a hazard to the public health. The fact 
that this “link” was purely hypothetical — and that the hypothesis was not 
even compatible with the facts of the case—was soon forgotten, but the 
negative image of hormones remained in the mind of the public.
European consumer organizations called for an immediate ban on the 
use of all hormones as a high-priority item on their agenda. They ne-
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glected to note that the Italian estrogen scandal occurred in a country 
where a hormone ban was already established (and had been for nearly 20 
years). The effectiveness of banning something that was already banned 
did not strike them as questionable.
SCIENTIFIC DELIBERATIONS AND POLITICAL AGENDAS
British Minister of Agriculture, Peter Walker, managed to work out an 
agreement for interim legislation (81/602/EEC) which did ban the stil- 
benes (such as DES) and thyrostatic agents, substances already banned in 
practically every country in the world, and required that the EC Commis-
sion conduct a detailed examination as to the “harmless or harmful ef-
fects” of the five compounds (estradiol-i/G, progesterone, testosterone, 
trenbolone acetate and zeranol).
An important feature of the 1981 Directive was that it upheld scientific 
criteria as the proper basis for the regulation of animal production drugs 
such as hormones. A scientific committee chaired by Professor Eric Lam-
ming of the University of Nottingham began work in 1981 and produced 
an interim report in September 1982. This report found the endogenous 
hormones (estradiol-17B, progesterone and testosterone) to present no 
hazard and requested further data on trenbolone acetate and zeranol.
The information requested by the “Lamming Committee” was supplied 
to the EC Commission by January 1984 and the Lamming committee was 
reconvened by the Commission to complete their report on trenbolone 
and zeranol. However, the Commission issued a proposal for new legisla-
tion (COM(84)295) without waiting for the Lamming Committee’s final 
report. The Commission proposed a directive that would have authorized 
the use of the endogenous hormones (on the basis of the first Lamming 
Committee report) and would have banned the xenobiotics, on the basis 
of the 1982 Lamming report.
The Lamming report was not finished by the autumn of 1985, and the 
European Parliament voted an opinion which called for a ban on the use 
of all hormones, including those previously approved by the Lamming 
Committee.
The Parliamentary vote calling for a total ban took place on October 11, 
1985. On October 30, the Commission issued a revised proposal (COM 
(85) 607) which similarly called for a total ban.
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Thus the Commission completely eliminated the role of science from 
the decision-making process on hormones. The new proposal implicitly 
rejected the scientific evidence it had previously accepted as the proper ba-
sis for definitive legislation on hormones. The new proposal, though deal-
ing with a matter of central importance to the protection of the public 
health, now seemed to be based primarily on political and economic con-
siderations.
WHENCE THE BEEF MOUNTAIN?
“Intervention stocks” consist of subsidized meat which is bought and 
stored by the EEC, at taxpayers’ expense, until it is so old as to have lost 
most of its value, at which time it is disposed of to a third country at a 
price far below the world market price for fresh beef.
By the latter half of 1985, when the European Parliament was debating 
the hormone issue, the amount of beef in intervention storage had 
reached a record 700,000 metric tons. This “beef mountain” was a major 
source of embarrassment to European politicians, who realized what the 
problem of overproduction of beef was due to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) system of beef intervention payments which directly re-
warded overproduction.
The consumer lobbyists offered the Euro politicians a solution to their 
dilemma. The idea was to ban hormones, which they said, were dangerous 
in the first place, and which also contributed to the overproduction re-
flected in the beef mountain.
The Euro politicians did not find the linking of hormone use and the 
beef mountain to be simplistic. It was that perception, together with con-
tinuing doubts as to the safety of hormones (in the absence of a definitive 
report from the Lamming Committee), that sealed the political fate of 
hormones in the EEC in 1985.
The result, legal or otherwise, was that on 31 December 1985 the Council 
of Ministers notified the EEC Member States that the directive banning 
the use of hormone implants in livestock as of 1 January 1988, was law.
All Member States were under an obligation to implement the Directive 
into their legal systems by 31 December 1987. All trading partners were un-
der an obligation to ensure that any meat they exported to the EC after 1 
January 1988 would have to be certified as not having come from animals
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treated with hormones - a deadline later extended by one year to 1 January 
1989.
In January 1987, the Standing Committee on Hormone Toxicology of 
the West German Society of Endocrinology met in Mainz to evaluate the 
new data on trenbolone and zeranol. Their published opinion was that 
these two hormones were suitable for use in the production of animals for 
human food.
The World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO) Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 
met in Rome in June 1987 to evaluate the safety data on all five hormones. 
They concluded that the five hormones posed no danger to human health 
when proper practices were followed. These JECFA findings were pub-
lished informally in December 1987, and the full JEFCA reports were offi-
cially published by WHO and FAO in March 1988.
At the World Veterinary Congress in Montreal on 18 August 1987, mem-
bers of the Lamming Committee, acting in their private capacities, pre-
sented a summary of their findings on all five hormones for the first time. 
The full findings were then published in the journal The Veterinary Record 
on 24 October 1987.
All five hormones had been declared to be safe for use as growth pro-
moters in cattle by the very scientists who had been selected by the Euro-
pean Commission to review them. What they were concerned about, as 
they indicated in their Interim Report in 1982, was that if safe hormones 
were banned, they would be replaced by unsafe products distributed 
through the Black Market.
Lamming’s poignant prophecy has been abundantly fulfilled.In Febru-
ary 1987, 10 months before the deadline by which importers of beef into 
the EC would have to certify that their meat was not hormone-treated, the 
United States began consultations under the Standards Code of the Gen-
eral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The U.S. alleged that since 
the hormone ban was without any scientific basis, it amounted to a tech-
nical trade barrier because non-EC countries had to guarantee that their 
meat exported to the EC had not come from hormone-treated animals - 
which could not be verified by any objective test.
On 18 November 1987, acting on a proposal from the Commission, the 
EC Council of Ministers adopted a Decision to extend for 12 months the
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deadline by which exporters of beef products to the community had to 
comply with the hormone ban directive. The new deadline was midnight 
on 31 December 1988.
Exactly a week after the EC postponement was announced, the U.S. 
pursuant to an Order signed by President Reagan under section 301 of the 
amended Trade Act of 1974, published in the Federal Register a list of retal-
iatory tariffs which would apply to selected products from the EC.
Then the unpredictable happened. The United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain (U.K.) had taken the Council to the European Court in March 1986, 
claiming that the hormone ban directive was invalid for a collection of al-
leged reasons. The European Court agreed with on of those reasons, a pro-
cedural one, and the Directive was invalidated.
At its next regular meeting, on 7 March 1988, the Council legislated by 
stampede.
On 16 December 1988, Dr. Lester Crawford, Administrator of the Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of USDA testified as a witness before 
the European Parliament’s Committee of Enquiry investigating the hor-
mone problem. Said Crawford in a press statement issued immediately af-
ter delivering his testimony: “If the European Community does not 
modify its hormone policy soon, meat trade between Europe and the 
United States will end...” He cited the re-appearance of DES in Europe as 
further evidence of public health problems caused by the hormone ban, 
and went on: “Ironically, the hormone ban itself has become the greatest 
threat to European meat consumers...Each year we must certify to the U.S. 
Congress that residue controls in exporting countries meet U.S. require-
ments. In the context or persistent reports of illegal use in EC countries of 
compounds with increasingly serious public health consequences, I don’t 
think we can make that certification.”
The U.S. had now taken two key steps. First, they had decided to retali-
ate by increasing tariffs on a range of European exports if American hor-
mone-produced meat could not gain entry to the EC. Second, and sepa-
rate from the retaliation, they were seriously considering banning further 
imports of European beef and veal owing to its probable contamination by 
dangerous Black Market hormones.
The amount of money involved is small in the context of total transat-
lantic trade worth $166 billion each year. U.S. beef product exports to the
276 Workshop White Papers
EC amount to about $155 million. Much of this is offals—“speciality 
meats” such as kidneys, livers and ox tongues, and about a third of that is 
imported for use in European pet foods.
At its last meeting before the 1988 Christmas break, on 19 December 
1988, the EC’s Council of Ministers agreed to allow the U.S. to continue to 
import hormone-produced beef for use in pet food.
The United States’ retaliation list, published in November 1987, im-
posed 100 percent tariffs on a wide range of European products to a value 
equivalent to the value of the U.S. meat refused entry into the EC. After 
the EC conceded over pet food, the U.S. correspondingly scaled down its 
retaliation to $97 million worth of tariffs. They targeted canned tomatoes, 
wine coolers, instant coffee, fruit juices, pet food, beef, tomato sauce and 
pork hams. The penalties were selected to fall mainly on Italy and West 
Germany, the two countries most passionately in support of the hormone 
ban. Between them, Italy and West Germany bore 70 percent of the retalia-
tory tariffs.
On 5 January 1989 USDA wrote to the Heads of the Veterinary Services 
of all European Community countries except those in Greece, Portugal 
and Luxembourg, saying that countries exporting meat products to the 
U.S. “must apply public health controls at least equal to those adminis-
tered by the USDA.” The letter pointed out that a proper residue control 
program is characterized by, among other things, an approval system for 
veterinary products based upon “rigorous scientific process”. USDA 
pointed out that the Black Market reports in Europe... “...have indicated 
that EEC countries are not effectively controlling use of such compounds. 
Use of unapproved compounds is occurring across species and is now in-
volving compounds of serious public health consequences.”
The trade war over meat from hormone-treated animals was now sepa-
rating itself from the dispute over the food safety consequences of the EC 
hormone ban. The U.S. Congress ranks domestic food safety higher than 
foreign trade. Dr. Crawford’s concern over imports of European meat 
products contaminated by residues of Black Market substances since the 
EC hormone ban, is not a pawn on the chessboard of international trade.
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